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We describe a quantum cryptography protocol with up to twenty four-dimensional (D = 4) states
generated by a polarization-, phase- and time-encoding transmitter. This protocol can be exper-
imentally realized with existing technology, drawing from time-encoded and polarization-encoded
systems. The protocol is error tolerant and has a quantum bit-rate of 2 per transmission/detection,
which when combined with state detection efficiency yields a qubit efficiency of up to 1 or double
that of BB84-like protocols.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Dv
We investigate the quantum information implications
of forming a single-photon superposition of time, phase
and polarization states. To our knowledge, the mutual
effects of combining multiple basis states of a single pho-
ton has has not been fully analyzed, although it can be
argued that Bennett established polarization, phase and
time encoding in 1992 [1] when he showed that quantum
key distribution (QKD) could be effected through use
of a pair of Franson’s unbalanced Mach-Zehnder (uMZ)
interferometers [2, 3]. While the encoding techniques em-
ployed in fiber based BB84 [4] require an overlap of the
temporal and polarization superposition modes to gener-
ate a random key, typically only one polarization mode
has been utilized, as required for good interferometric vis-
ibility [5]. This investigation shows that an inclusion of
extended polarization coding, together with the typical
fiber QKD elements of phase and time, allows creation
of multi-state superpositions of single photons that can
be simply exploited to effect efficient and secure QKD—
quantum dense coding without entanglement.
The existence of quantum dense coding systems have
been discussed in theory [6, 7], but no practical non-
entangled quantum cryptography (QC) concept with
Hilbert dimension D > 2 has been presented or realized.
By including polarization mode encoding with the stan-
dard time and phase outputs from fiber based BB84, a
4-level single-photon superposition is simply created.
An example of the common fiber based BB84 super-
position is shown in Fig. 1, and is physically described
v h+−
∆t
FIG. 1: Example of a single-photon superposition, a super-
position in time, polarization and phase.
as
|ψ0〉 = |h〉|t〉 ± |v〉|t
′〉√
2
, (1)
where ψ0 is a temporal and polarization superposition
of plus-or-minus vertical polarization (±v) delayed by
∆t following horizontal polarization (h), and where |t〉
identifies the portion of the superposition at time t, and
|t′〉 ≡ t′ = t+∆t. This type of superposition is commonly
formed in fiber based BB84 quantum cryptography appli-
cations [8–11], and the ±1 (phase of φ = 0 or pi) preceding
the v is usually added through phase-modulation (fiber
based BB84 usually also randomly adds φ = pi/2 and
3pi/2 to create uncertainty and enable the quantum-key
exchange).
The Eq. 1 superpositions can be manipulated to create
the four fundamental single-photon basis states that can
be expanded into twenty 4-level states in total, with the
four primary states presented below:
|ψ(1)1 〉 = |h〉|t〉, |ψ(1)2 〉 = |v〉|t〉,
|ψ(1)3 〉 = |h〉|t′〉, |ψ(1)2 〉 = |v〉|t′〉, (2)
where we use the bra-ket notation such that 〈ψ(1)i |ψ(1)j 〉 =
〈t|〈p|q〉|t′〉 = 〈t|δpq |t′〉 = δpqδtt′ = 0 if either p 6= q or t 6=
t′, but δpqδtt′ = 1 when p = q and t = t
′, for p ∈ {h, v}
and q ∈ {h, v}, as usual.
The mathematics are simplified with definitions
|H〉 ≡ |h〉|t〉, |V 〉 ≡ |v〉|t〉, |H ′〉 ≡ |h〉|t′〉, |V ′〉 ≡ |v〉|t′〉.
These primed and unprimed states in linear combina-
tions form left-and-right diagonal, or left-and-right circu-
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lar, states in the primed or unprimed time coordinates:
D =
H + V√
2
, D′ =
H ′ + V ′√
2
,
D¯ =
H − V√
2
, D¯′ =
H ′ − V ′√
2
,
R =
H + iV√
2
, R′ =
H ′ + iV ′√
2
,
L =
H − iV√
2
, L′ =
H ′ − iV ′√
2
. (3)
These definitions, together with the techniques for find-
ing mutually unbiased bases (MUBs) presented in [12–
14], are used to specify the remaining four D = 4 MUBs
for this non-entangled single-photon 4-level system:
|ψ(2)1 〉 =
|D〉+ |D′〉√
2
, |ψ(2)2 〉 =
|D〉 − |D′〉√
2
,
|ψ(2)3 〉 =
|D¯〉 − |D¯′〉√
2
, |ψ(2)4 〉 =
|D¯〉+ |D¯′〉√
2
, (4)
|ψ(3)1 〉 =
|D〉+ i|D¯′〉√
2
, |ψ(3)2 〉 =
|D〉 − i|D¯′〉√
2
,
|ψ(3)3 〉 =
|D¯〉 − i|D′〉√
2
, |ψ(3)4 〉 =
|D¯〉+ i|D′〉√
2
, (5)
|ψ(4)1 〉 =
|R〉 − |L′〉√
2
, |ψ(4)2 〉 =
|L〉 − |R′〉√
2
,
|ψ(4)3 〉 =
|R〉+ |L′〉√
2
, |ψ(4)4 〉 =
|L〉+ |R′〉√
2
, (6)
|ψ(5)1 〉 =
|R〉+ i|R′〉√
2
, |ψ(5)2 〉 =
|R〉 − i|R′〉√
2
,
|ψ(5)3 〉 =
|L〉 − i|L′〉√
2
, |ψ(5)4 〉 =
|L〉+ i|L′〉√
2
. (7)
These single-photon states form twenty 4-level qudits,
in contrast with 2-level qubits, and it is evident that
|〈ψmi |ψnj 〉|2 = δij for all {i, j} when m = n, and it is
easily demonstrated that |〈ψmi |ψnj 〉|2 = 1/4 for all {i, j}
when m 6= n, proving that the ψmi form five 4-level
single-photon MUBs. Other non-optimal basis sets can
be found, but these five bases represent the maximum
number of 4-level bases that exist when D is a power of
a prime [14].
An experimental realization of these single-photon
states could be used to form an efficient and secure QC
protocol if the states can be optimally detected. For ex-
ample, 4-level QC systems can tolerate error rates on the
qudits of 0.25/qudit for individual attacks [15], and error
rates of 0.1893/qudit for coherent attacks [16–18], e.g., as
demonstrated in [19] and especially Table 1 in [20]. These
tolerable qudit error rates are to be compared with the
maximum allowable error rates for single-photon 2-level
QC systems of 0.1464/qubit for individual attacks and
0.1100/qubit for coherent attacks (the 0.1100/qubit has
been shown to be the maximum allowable error rate for
unconditional qubit security for BB84 [17]).
One technique to prepare the D = 4 states is mod-
eled with the Fig. 2 optics. In this approach a h pho-
ton is transmitted beyond the first polarizing beamsplit-
ter (PBS) and encounters the first Pockels cell (PC)
that can be modulated to transmit either a horizontal,
vertical, or positive diagonal polarized photon (h, v or
d = (h+ v)/
√
2) as the input state to the uMZ [21]. For
the case that the first PC rotates the h polarization to d,
the second PBS causes an h and v superposition of the
single photon to form, where the v position travels the
upper path and the h position the lower path through
the uMZ. For the case that the first PC transmits h or
v, the h polarization will pass directly through the PBS
to the lower-arm of the uMZ, and the v polarization will
be reflected by the PBS to the upper-arm of the uMZ.
For both cases, the lower-arm includes no optics to al-
ter the state of the photon (or photon position) traveling
this path, but the upper-arm contains a phase modula-
tor (PM) that randomly adds a phase delay of φ = 0 or
pi to the upper-arm photon (or photon position). The
uMZ is complete with a third PBS that transmits h and
reflects v so that for the first case the Eq. 1 state ψ0
is transmitted onto the quantum channel, i.e., the trans-
mitted state is ±v delayed by ∆t following h, where t and
t′ = t+∆t are as defined earlier, and ∆t is the time dif-
ference between the long and short arms of the uMZ [22],
but for the second case either h is transmitted at time
t, or else v is transmitted at time t′. For both cases the
second PC is modulated to rotate the t or t′ polarization
to h, v, d, d¯, r, or l (r and l are left and right circu-
lar polarization: r = (h+ iv)/
√
2 and l = (h − iv)/√2),
where we suppose that the additional phase of ±i can
be added as needed at the t′ states through quarter-wave
(Q) modulation of the first PC.
The Fig. 2 optics, with its degrees of freedom defined
by the two PCs (symmetry operators), can be used to cre-
ate any of the twenty ψmi states. Based on, (1) security
of 4-level systems to individual (25% to 26.66%) and co-
PM
D M M
PBS PBS
Laser
v h
PC
Polarization
 Controller
h
+
−
PC
PBS
FIG. 2: Optical model with degrees of freedom needed to cre-
ate 4-level single photons. Optics include a laser source that
transmits both a bright timing-pulse and single photons onto
the quantum channel, a polarization controller, three polariz-
ing beamsplitters (PBSs), a phase modulator (PM), and two
Pockels cells (PCs). The early position exits the uMZ with
h-polarization, and the late position with ±v-polarization.
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herent attacks (18.93%), (2) the marginal increase in se-
curity against individual attacks for twenty 4-level states
versus eight 4-level states (1.66%) relative to the dense-
coding bit rate efficiencies [ρ(2-bases) = 1, ρ(3-bases) =
2/3, ρ(4-bases) = 1/2, ρ(5-bases) = 2/5], and (3) be-
cause of the Shannon reconciliation limit based on ini-
tial error rates, we only consider eight 4-level states in
two bases: bases ψmi for i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, and m ∈ {2, 4}
(Eqs. 4 and 6). These eight states (ψ2i , and ψ
4
i ) can
be resolved in point-to-point QKD with interferometric
techniques and the BLT02-like [23] optics seen in Fig. 3,
with a protocol detection efficiency of η = 1/2 if only two
of the basis states are used [24].
The efficient detection of the ψ
(2∨4)
i states can be ac-
complished by modeling the three PCs in Fig. 3 as rota-
tion operators P̂
(m)
1 , P̂
(m)
2 , and P̂
(m)
3 , respectively, where
the m superscript denotes either the ψ2 or ψ4 basis, and
by letting the two delay legs ∆1 and ∆2 be denoted by
operators ∆̂1 and ∆̂2 [25]. In this model the early (pe)
and late (pl) positions of the D = 4 states enter the op-
tical system and encounter the operators in order from
left to right: P̂
(m)
1 , ∆̂1, P̂
(m)
2 , ∆̂2, to the final P̂
(m)
3 rota-
tion operator, and then arrive at the PBS that projects
v polarizations onto detector Dv, and h polarizations
onto detector Dh. With this optical model, resolution of
these states requires either half-wave operations of P̂
(2)
1 ≡
Ĥ(45)(t) + Ĥ(−45)(t +∆t) for the pe and pl polarization
positions (times t and t′), or quarter-wave operations of
P̂
(4)
1 ≡ Q̂, at both t and t′ for the pe and pl polariza-
tion positions. Except for these operational differences,
the remaining operator elements to resolve the ψ2i and
ψ4i states are fixed (thus we drop the superscripts), with
P̂2 ≡ Ĥ(90)(t+2∆t)+Ĥ(45)(t+∆t)+Ĥ(90)(t) rotation op-
erations, and P̂3 ≡ Î(t+∆t)+Ĥ(45)(t+2∆t)+ Î(t+3∆t).
Using the optical models defined by Figs. 2 and 3, and
operator notation as described, we find ordered opera-
tions that allow resolution of the Eqs. 4 and 6 states
Ô
[
ψ(2)
] ≡ P̂3∆̂2P̂2∆̂1P̂ (2)1 ,
Ô
[
ψ(4)
] ≡ P̂3∆̂2P̂2∆̂1P̂ (4)1 . (8)
M M
PBS
pl pe
PCPC
Dv
Dh
M M
PBS PBS PBS
∆
1
∆
2
PBS
PC
FIG. 3: An optical model that permits discrimination of the
D = 4 states presented in Eqs. 2 and 4 to 7. Optics include
three PCs that modulate the early (pe) and late (pl) super-
positions, two time-delay operators composed of four PBSs
and four Ms that temporally delay v positions relative to h
positions (∆̂1 ≡ t′ − t = ∆t and ∆̂2 ≡ 2∆t), and a PBS that
follows the third PC and projects h and v onto Dh and Dv .
The Ô
[
ψ(2)
]
and Ô
[
ψ(4)
]
operate on the arriving states
to direct them in a self consistent manner to the appro-
priate time slots and detectors to resolve their respective
bases. For example,
Ô
[
ψ(2)
]|ψ(2)1 〉 ⇔ Ô
[
ψ(4)
]|ψ(4)1 〉 → |v〉|t+ 2∆t〉 ≡ V ′′
⇒ ψ21 ∧ ψ41 7→ Dv(t+ 2∆t),
Ô
[
ψ(2)
]|ψ(2)2 〉 ⇔ Ô
[
ψ(4)
]|ψ(4)2 〉 → |h〉|t+ 2∆t〉 ≡ H ′′
⇒ ψ22 ∧ ψ42 7→ Dh(t+∆t),
Ô
[
ψ(2)
]|ψ(2)3 〉 ⇔ Ô
[
ψ(4)
]|ψ(4)3 〉 → |v〉|t+ 3∆t〉 ≡ V ′′′
⇒ ψ23 ∧ ψ43 7→ Dv(t+ 3∆t),
Ô
[
ψ(2)
]|ψ(2)4 〉 ⇔ Ô
[
ψ(4)
]|ψ(4)4 〉 → |h〉|t+∆t〉 ≡ H ′
⇒ ψ24 ∧ ψ44 7→ Dh(t+∆t), (9)
confirming the efficient detection scheme. In contrast,
a measurement any of these eight arriving states in the
other basis causes random detections in consistent sta-
tistical distributions at the correct times and detectors.
This realization is that
Ô
[
ψ(m)
]|ψ(n)i 〉 =
a|H ′〉+√2b|D′′〉+ c|V ′′′〉
2
, (10)
where the single prime coordinate implies detection at
time t′ = t + ∆t, the double prime coordinate implies
detection at time t′′ = t + 2∆t, and the triple prime
coordinate implies detection at time t′′′ = t+ 3∆t, when
m 6= n, and where |a| = |b| = |c| = 1. From this result it
is clear that a measurement of any of these eight states
in the incorrect basis will result in random detections on
either Dh at time t
′, Dh or Dv at t
′′, or on Dv at time
t + 3∆t, each with equal detection probability 1/4 for
each detector at each time.
With these physics models, a quantum dense key ex-
change can be accomplished. The exchange of a secret
with the ψ2 and ψ4 basis sets (eight states, two bases)
proceeds similarly to BB84. That is, Alice could ran-
domly prepare single photons in one of the eight ψ2i or
ψ4i states and direct them along the quantum channel to
Bob who randomly measures the arriving states in one of
the two bases as they arrive (Ô[ψ2] or Ô[ψ4] operational
measurement sets). Bob then publicly announces his ba-
sis choice and the relative times t of his detections, but
not the absolute times of his detections that includes t
and some multiple of ∆t. Alice then publicly announces
which of his measurements correlated to the transmission
basis, and Bob discards the half of his measurements
within the wrong basis to complete the sifting process.
Alice and Bob then reconcile [26–29] and privacy amplify
[27, 30] their key to complete the exchange.
A proof of unconditional security is beyond the scope
of this effort [31]. However, some clarifying observations
can be made. For example, this 4-level entanglement-
free concept is to 4-level entangled systems as BB84 is
to E91. Therefore, any unconditional security proof of 4-
level entangled systems will apply to this proposition. It
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is therefore observed that the d-level security proofs for
individual (25.00% error rate for two 4-level bases) and
coherent attacks (18.93%) do apply. It is also noted that
the coherent limit of 11.00% is the unconditional limit
calculated for BB84/E91. Thus it is likely that 18.93%
is the unconditional security limit for 4-level systems, or
a close approximation.
It is also noted that these concepts can be implemented
with true single-photon sources, or with weak coherent
pulses (WCP). The WCP are easy to create, but have
been shown to limit range of operation as compared with
true single photon QC systems. Regarding WCP, this
system allows monitoring of photon number in the error
rate as two detectors are used, and detections are ob-
served on the two detectors at three unique times on the
Dh and Dv detectors. Thus multiple detections on Dh
or Dv at t
′, t′′ or t′′′, or detections on Dv at t
′, or on Dh
at t′′′, give clues about fidelity and possible attacks. It is
also clear that these concepts can be implemented with
decoy states [32] which provides a test of the presence of
certain attacks on the quantum key.
Like Cerf, et al. [20], we conclude that a two-bases
protocol is preferred to a D+1 basis protocol because its
maximum error rate is only slightly lower, and because
each detection leads to two bits, which when combined
with the basis choice selection efficiency of η = 1/2, im-
plies a rate of 1-bit per transmission with ideal single-
photon QC in a lossless channel (which of course does
not exist): the secret key rate is larger than for D = 2
BB84, or for multiple bases in D = 4 QC. Further, the
amount of key compression in the privacy amplification
is lower due to the higher tolerance of errors. Cerf, et al.,
also showed that the tolerable error approaches 1/2 when
D →∞, and we have shown in a general way how to in-
crease the dimension with polarization, phase and time
encoding of larger and larger plane-wave dimensions.
We have described a new high-dimensional quantum
key distribution system that employs the simultaneous
use of several single photon basis states. These states
include the polarization states as used in, for exam-
ple, BB84, combined with time-domain encoding, as
used with Franson’s uMZs, and phase encoding. Exten-
sion of BB84-like protocols to include an infinitely large
plane wave basis states allows the generation of high-
dimensional quantum states that can be realized with
existing quantum cryptography experimental apparatus.
APPENDIX
Other 4-level bases can be found and used to effect a
quantum key exchange. For example, the Eq. 1 super-
positions can be manipulated to create three sets of mu-
tually unbiased 4-level single-photon basis states—twelve
states in total—through symmetry operations (rotations)
of the early or late polarizations, as demonstrated in Eqs.
11 to 13:
|χ(1)1 〉 =
|H〉+ |V ′〉√
2
, |χ(1)2 〉 =
|H〉 − |V ′〉√
2
,
|χ(1)3 〉 =
|V 〉+ |H ′〉√
2
, |χ(1)4 〉 =
|V 〉 − |H ′〉√
2
, (11)
|χ(2)1 〉 =
|H〉+ |H ′〉√
2
, |χ(2)2 〉 =
|H〉 − |H ′〉√
2
,
|χ(2)3 〉 =
|V 〉 − |V ′〉√
2
, |χ(2)4 〉 =
|V 〉+ |V ′〉√
2
, (12)
|χ(3)1 〉 = |D〉, |χ(3)2 〉 = D¯〉,
|χ(3)3 〉 = |D′〉, |χ(3)4 〉 = D¯′〉. (13)
It is evident that |〈χmi |χnj 〉|2 = δij for all {i, j} when m =
n, but that |〈χmi |χnj 〉|2 = 1/4 for all {i, j} when m 6= n,
proving that the χmi form three-sets of mutually unbiased
4-level single-photon basis states for m,n ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
To prove that the states in Eqs. 11 to 13 represent a
complete set of dimension D = 4, MUBs, we begin by
identifying one pair of maximally non-orthogonal states.
For our purposes, we choose the states |χ1〉 and |χ2〉 of
Eqs. 11 and 12, although any pair can work equally
well. States χ1i and χ
2
j are also quite general and simple
rotations yield other equivalent superpositions, of which
a specific example is states |χ1i 〉 and |χ2j〉 where |h〉 → |r〉
and |v〉 → −|l〉.
In any case, what is sought are other solutions of the
form
|λi〉 = ai|H〉+ bi|V 〉+ ci|H ′〉+ di|V ′〉, (14)
where ai = Ai · ei·θai and bi = Bi · ei·θbi , etc., with
the restriction that |〈λi|λj〉|2 = δij . As before, the re-
quirement on new states |λ〉 are that they are unbiased
with both |χ1i 〉 and |χ2j〉 D = 4 states, or specifically
|〈χ1i |λj〉|2 = 1/4 for all {i, j} and |〈χ2i |λj〉|2 = 1/4 for all
{i, j}. The conditions can be applied to yield
AD cos(θad) = 0,
AC cos(θac) = 0,
BD cos(θbd) = 0,
BC cos(θbc) = 0, (15)
where θxy = θx − θy, and also
AD = BC = AC = BD = 0. (16)
for any particular |λ〉. (The i’s were omitted for clarity.)
This results in the following:
either {A,B} = 0, (17)
or {C,D} = 0, (18)
and the values for the phase angles {θa, θb, θc, θd} can
be decided as a matter of convenience. Thus, the only
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possible solution for the λi are the ones labeled |χ3i 〉 in
Eq. 13 (or simple rotations of them).
The efficient detection of the χmi states proceeds sim-
ilarly as before. P̂
(1)
1 ≡ Î at both t and t′, but P̂ (2)1 ≡
Î(t) + Ĥ(90)(t + ∆t) for the pe and pl polarization po-
sitions (times t and t′). The remaining operator ele-
ments to resolve the χ1i and χ
2
j states are fixed, with
P̂
(1)
2 ⇔ P̂ (2)2 ≡ Ĥ(90)(t+2∆t) + Ĥ(45)(t+∆t) + Ĥ(90)(t)
rotation operations, and P̂
(1)
3 ⇔ P̂ (2)3 ≡ Î(t + ∆t) +
Ĥ(45)(t+ 2∆t) + Î(t + 3∆t). The χ3i states are resolved
when P̂
(3)
1 ≡ Ĥ(45), P̂ (3)2 ≡ Ĥ(90), and when P̂ (3)3 ≡ Î for
all times.
Using the optical models defined by Figs. 2 and 3,
and operator notation as described, we find ordered op-
erational sets that allow resolution of the Eqs. 11 to 13
states
Ô
[
χ(1)
] ≡ P̂ (1)3 ∆̂2P̂ (1)2 ∆̂1P̂ (1)1 ,
Ô
[
χ(2)
] ≡ P̂ (2)3 ∆̂2P̂ (2)2 ∆̂1P̂ (2)1 ,
Ô
[
χ(3)
] ≡ P̂ (3)3 ∆̂2P̂2(3)∆̂1P̂ (3)1 . (19)
These operators direct the arriving states in a self consis-
tent manner to the appropriate time slots and detectors
to resolve their respective bases:
Ô
[
χ(1)
]|χ(1)1 〉 ≡ Ô
[
χ(2)
]|χ(2)1 〉 → −|h〉|t+ 2∆t〉
⇒ χ(1)1 ∧ χ(2)1 7→ Dh(t+ 2∆t),
Ô
[
χ(1)]|χ(1)2 〉 ≡ Ô
[
χ(2)
]|χ(2)2 〉 → |v〉|t+ 2∆t〉
⇒ χ(1)2 ∧ χ(2)2 7→ Dv(t+ 2∆t),
Ô
[
χ(1)]|χ(1)3 〉 ≡ Ô
[
χ(2)
]|χ(2)3 〉 → |v〉|t+ 3∆t〉
⇒ χ(1)3 ∧ χ(2)3 7→ Dv(t+ 3∆t),
Ô
[
χ(1)]|χ(1)4 〉 ≡ Ô
[
χ(2)
]|χ(2)4 〉 → |h〉|t+∆t〉
⇒ χ(1)4 ∧ χ(2)4 7→ Dh(t+∆t), (20)
and that
Ô[χ(3)]|χ(3)1 〉 → H ′ ⇒ χ(3)1 7→ Dh(t+∆t),
Ô[χ(3)]|χ(3)2 〉 → V ′′ ⇒ χ(3)2 7→ Dv(t+ 2∆t),
Ô[χ(3)]|χ(3)3 〉 → H ′′ ⇒ χ(3)3 7→ Dh(t+ 2∆t),
Ô[χ(3)]|χ(3)4 〉 → V ′′′ ⇒ χ(3)4 7→ Dv(t+ 3∆t), (21)
Measurement of the arriving states in the wrong basis
causes random detections in consistent statistical distri-
butions at the correct times and detectors:
Ô
[
χ(m)
]|χ(n)i 〉 ≈
|aH ′〉+√2b|D′′〉+ c|V ′′′〉
2
, (22)
when m 6= n, and where |a| = |b| = |c| = 1. This result
demonstrates that a measurement of any state in the in-
correct basis will result in random detections on either
Dh at time t+∆t, Dh or Dv at t+2∆t, or on Dv at time
t+3∆t, each with equal detection probability p = 1/4 for
each detector at each time. It is also clear that none of
the χmi states are included in the ψ
n
i states. Here we find
only three MUBs, but the maximum number of MUBs
are the five presented earlier.
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